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Abstract 
This article examines the dynamics of Portuguese media groups in a context of 
worldwide financialization, and the new media regulation authority established in 2008. 
It considers the economic and financial performance of the major media groups, in an 
environment characterized by staff dismissals and decreasing advertising revenue. This 
focus on the dynamics of media groups is combined with the analysis of the 
performance of a new media regulator, established in 2006, which has been allocated 
specific powers to control ownership concentration. From documentary analysis I will 
highlight the acquiescence of the media regulator to the ‘media in crisis’ argument, the 
consequences of which include a concentration of local radio and a silence surrounding 
job cuts in otherwise profitable media groups. A disturbing consequence of the crisis 
concerns the vulnerability of this sector to capital investment funds, notably Angolan, 
whose ownership structure lacks transparency. 
 
As business models in the media industries worldwide were challenged by new technological 
advances, Portuguese media groups experienced difficult times, particularly after 2000. In recent 
years, annual losses have been reported; redundancies have become an everyday word in 
newsrooms, and the internal financial difficulties of media groups have been publicly debated. This 
situation has been exacerbated by the financial and economic global crisis since 2007/2008, the 
effects of which have been felt worldwide (Claessens et al., 2010), particularly in the more 
peripheral economies of the Eurozone such as Greece, Spain and Portugal. Some of the key 
developments contributing to this crisis were “the emergence and proliferation of neo-liberal policy 
regimes, the globalization of financial activity, the financialization of Western capitalism, and the 
historic convergence of computer processing, telecommunications, and mass media technologies” 
(Hope, 2010: 649). 
Financialization is a key process in regard to current trends in media industries. High levels of 
dependence on capital and indebtedness are evident as media industries have been unable to save 
themselves from the consequences of the global financial crisis (Almiron, 2010; Winseck, 2010). In 
different national economies, communication companies and groups affected by the crisis were
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already facing the paradigm shift from analogue to digital technologies. The combination of these 
two factors had profound effects. Traditional media organizations were challenged by new business 
practices as the Internet-based new media affected the market positioning of newspapers and 
magazines. Old copyright models in cinema and music industries were challenged by social media 
corporations (Sparks, 2004).  
The weaker economies of the Eurozone were particularly affected by the crisis, either because of 
banking system fragilities, as in Ireland or Spain or high sovereign debts, as in Greece and Portugal. 
Foreign intervention was required, with the International Monetary Fund and the European Union 
setting up programs to stabilize those economies. As the crisis affected the availability of credit, and 
indebted governments were pressured into austerity budgets, many economic sectors were affected. 
In a context of increasing financialization, an institutional-level assessment is required in order to 
gain a more thorough understanding of the effects of the crisis upon media groups. 
The aim of this article [1] is to assess the status, performance and regulation of the media in 
Portugal, a peripheral economy dependent on overseas capital. In 2006, a new media regulator, the 
Entidade Reguladora para a Comunicação Social (ERC) was established. The ERC was given new 
powers, specifically in regard to ownership, concentration and market behavior. Building upon a 
documentary analysis of the regulator’s reports, as well as those of other relevant social actors, such 
as the journalists’ union, I will provide an overview of Portuguese media sector from 2008/09 
onwards. 
Financialization of media in the context of a world crisis 
Financialization has been a crucial concept in explaining the difficulties faced by major media 
industries in the course of the crisis. It highlights “the extraordinary growth in the size of the 
financial sector and financial assets relative to the industrial and other sectors of the economy over 
the past 25 years and especially since the mid-1990s” (Winseck, 2010). For instance, Almiron and 
Segovia (2012) argue that the major Spanish media group, Prisa, faced a severe crisis partly caused 
by the group’s financialization. Fitzgerald (2012) also draws on the concept to theorize the 
development of the biggest media groups worldwide, notably Time Warner, Bertelsmann and News 
Corporation. 
Besides the internal problems in media groups caused by high debt levels, a more 
comprehensive concern has emerged. Resources that might otherwise be allocated to production 
and newsgathering are being diverted to meet the high costs of capital (Winseck, 2008). When they 
are unable to fulfill financial obligations, media groups have to renegotiate capital structure 
arrangements in ways that are unaligned with the principles of journalism and public service. 
The theory of digital capitalism proposed by Chakravartty and Schiller (2010: 672) ascribes a 
central role to information technology in a situation characterized by “systemic overcapacity which, 
coupled with capital’s growing financialization, has plunged the market system into crisis”. 
Previously, concentration and internationalization were major trends in the cultural and media 
industries (McChesney, 2000), with technological imperatives and logics of synergy identified as 
the foremost drivers. However, in more recent years, pressure on board administrations to meet 
financial objectives has become “the ‘first instance’ of strategy formulation in the cultural 
industries” while “the rapid growth of these corporations has come at a price of servicing large-
scale debt, combined with the pressing need to ensure competitive levels of market capitalization” 
(Fitzgerald, 2012: 40). 
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Financialization is therefore a key concept in understanding why media are in crisis at the same 
time as particular enterprises are challenged to maintain their traditional business models (Couldry, 
2009; Sparks, 2004) alongside journalistic ideals (Mancini, 2013). Readership levels are low, and 
newspaper circulation is dropping, due to the competition of online news sites and other social 
media. Television and radio are likewise being faced with new consumption habits that undermine 
the traditional positioning of these media. 
The result has been a dying business model. Profit margins of news organizations are decreasing 
and, in some cases, unable to meet the expectations of shareholders and the requirements of signed 
financial contracts. News has lost value in the eyes of advertisers as online platforms have 
decoupled advertising revenues from mass media news content. Meanwhile, small ads have 
migrated to online sites, thus depriving newspapers of an important source of income (Fenton, 
2011). The result has been job-cuts in media organizations and the shutdown of many newspapers.  
From a sectoral perspective, however, it should not be assumed that the media is in crisis 
(Winseck, 2010). The media universe is growing, not just in terms of the number of channels, but 
also in terms of the money involved. There has been a growing fragmentation and diversification of 
channels, both in the case of mass media forms, such as satellite television, and of new digital 
platforms, such as online streaming services. The media universe is undergoing a revolution, as 
social media platforms like Facebook or Twitter capture new users and as messages exchanged 
between users redefine the environment in which they live. However, this does not mean that 
people are better served as far as the quality of information and its contribution to the health of 
democracy are concerned. Fenton (2011) is rather critical of the new media ecology: “The 
depreciation of the current business model together with increasing commercial pressures is, as a 
result, devaluing the pursuit of news journalism that is in the public interest and impacting in 
particular on original newsgathering and investigative reporting as well as on local news” (64). 
Karpinnen (2009) also argues against a naïve conception of pluralism in the new digital world, as 
concentration is also taking place in the new environment, while Winseck (2008) points out that 
more outlets do not mean different outlets. Concern over the nature of media pluralism, therefore, 
remains relevant in the era of digital plenty. The drive to increase economic efficiency in the media 
sector has led to the dismissal of journalists, leaving newsrooms slightly emptier but with the same 
outputs to meet. Fewer reporters to do the same amount of work means less investigative and time-
consuming journalism, less on-site reporting and more dependence on official sources and 
professional press releases (Fenton, 2011).  
In other respects, the ‘crisis’ has become an argument that legitimizes the restructuring 
strategies of media groups. In some cases, even in in traditional media sectors, commercial 
performance has been sustained (Nieminem, 2009; Mateo et al., 2010), thus showing that 
overgeneralizing the plight of media industries can be misleading. However, public discourses tend 
to suggest that the difficulties of particular companies stand for the sector as a generic whole. The 
fact that some companies are facing a declining market demand does not necessarily mean that they 
are all suffering losses. Nevertheless, media groups still have to prove their value to shareholders. 
The strategy, then, has been to cut costs (and jobs) in order to maintain profitability. However, news 
discourses on the economic crisis and, more specifically, the crisis in the media sector, have served 
to minimize public disapproval of these strategies. The downsizing of operations is legitimated by 
the prevailing discourse on the need to cut costs. The extent to which the “media in crisis” argument 
has been accepted by policy-makers and regulators serves to support media groups’ corporate 
strategies (see Winseck, 2010). 
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The Portuguese Media environment: crisis, group performance and 
dismissals 
Portuguese media are characterized by a dual system. In audio-visual terms, there is a public 
television and radio service (for national and international audiences) and private groups operating 
in television (Media Capital and Impresa, both with an open-access television channel and 
subscription services). In private radio, Media Capital is the more prominent, followed by the RR - 
Renascença Group which belongs to the Catholic Church. In the press domain, Cofina and 
Controlinveste own daily titles, and Impresa have a weekly newspaper and a magazine.  
Broadcasting services operated within a public service framework up to 1992, when the first of 
two national terrestrial private television services was launched. Private channels rapidly gained 
audience leadership, which, coupled with the challenge of financially driven policy frameworks 
within the state sphere, served to put the public service under continuous pressure. As Sousa and 
Silva (2009) observe, “The present-day configuration of the media system in general and the 
broadcasting sector in particular is strictly intertwined through the growth of multimedia groups in 
the country” (90). Rules on the concentration of ownership have been loosening since the 
democratic revolution in 1974, with the adoption of a more qualitative approach to interpreting 
statutory limits. As a result, multimedia groups have established themselves and consolidated their 
position without significant debate or opposition from the regulators (Silva, 2007). As Sousa and 
Silva duly note (2009), “despite the occasional political rhetoric, successive governments have 
acted as if media concentration should be allowed and even encouraged” (97). 
Portugal currently has five major private media groups. Two of them can be considered historic 
players: Impresa and Rádio Renascença (RR). The former began with the launch of a weekly 
newspaper in 1973 and later consolidated as a multimedia group when it won one of the licenses to 
a terrestrial television channel. RR, meanwhile, is a group with links to the Catholic Church, that 
operates mainly in radio, after failing to secure the second private television channel license, (which 
was acquired by Media Capital). Although originating in the press sector, Media Capital is now 
mainly an audio-visual group, with a strong presence in the radio sector and the second terrestrial 
television private channel. Cofina is a group with press interests in daily news, finance and sports 
news. The configuration of Controlinveste is the result of already-held outlets in news and sports 
(subscription TV and a newspaper) combined with the 2005 buyout of news media outlets within an 
historic group, Lusomundo (which had holdings in radio, press and cinema). Lusomundo had been 
bought out by the Portuguese telecom group in 2000. 
The financialization of the Portuguese media is particularly visible in the case of the 
Controlinveste group, which had to contract debt in order to buy the former Lusomundo media 
outlets. However also, in the case of Impresa, financial difficulties in coping with large-scale debts 
have been identified as a reason for the restructuring processes. Media Capital has also been in the 
spotlight because the majority of its capital is held by the Spanish group Prisa, which is itself facing 
large financial problems (Almiron and Segovia, 2012). The centrality of finance capital in the 
managerial strategies of the Portuguese media groups was reinforced by the financial crisis that has 
affected the country since 2008. As it is still a young democracy in the European context, Portugal 
(which lived under a dictatorship from 1926 to 1974) has an economy considered to be fragile and 
not very productive. In 2011, for the third time since the establishment of its democratic system, 
Portugal was forced to seek external assistance. The ‘troika’, comprising the International Monetary 
Fund, the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism and the European Central Bank, imposed a 
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policy of austerity that led the country into recession, with high unemployment rates, cuts in wages 
and growing family poverty [2]. 
The Portuguese news media were particularly affected by the adverse economic conditions; 
advertising and subscription income declined as noted in the Annual reports of the major media 
groups [3]. According to the agency providing data on advertising market shares, advertising spend 
declined by an estimated 11% in 2011, and between 15–20% in 2012 [4]. Nevertheless, the overall 
market positions of major media outlets in Portugal remained unaltered from 2008 to 2011. Despite 
decreasing circulation, the most popular newspapers maintained their market share, while the most 
popular radio stations likewise preserved their position over that period. In regard to free-access 
television, the public service broadcaster, RTP, saw its funding mechanism damaged by 
governmental cuts as the country faced the transition to digital transmission. However, this change 
did not lead to the development of new television stations and has even resulted in a loss of 
terrestrial coverage and the growth of subscriptions to pay television (Denicoli and Sousa, 2012). 
However, the apparent continuation of most media services does not mean that the sector 
experienced non-turbulent times. From 2008 to 2011, according to the journalists’ union [5], as 
many as 484 journalists lost their jobs—and this figure only refers to regular posts, not freelancers 
or reporters with precarious job security working on a regular basis at newsrooms. In 2009, one year 
after the beginning of the crisis, there was a 47% increase in the number of newly unemployed 
journalists. The problem with job retention might be expected to stem primarily from the small 
scale of some media companies such that they would account for most of the unemployment. 
However, from 2009 to 2011, 62.6% of reporter redundancies (in regular job positions) originated 
in the five major Portuguese media groups (Cofina, Controlinveste, Impresa, Media Capital and 
RR) [6].  
It is important to note that these hard times for journalism professionals did not directly reflect 
losses in the media companies’ revenue, as they were not especially severe over this period (see 
Table 1). In fact, from 2009 to 2011, when the effects of the crisis were most acute, only two 
companies reported an annual loss: RR in 2010 and Impresa in 2011. In the case of RR, losses have 
not been explained, and since it is not a publicly listed company, no annual reports are publicly 
released [7]. However, during 2010, the group conducted an internal reorganization, reducing the 
number of employees. Impresa’s losses, meanwhile, appear to stem from an accounting situation. 
The group attributed the losses to asset impairments, meaning that the accounting value of some 
assets depreciated due to the economic and financial crisis. 
Cofina (mainly a newspaper group) reported profits for all three years from 2009 and 2011 yet 
was responsible for 15% of reporter redundancies in that same period. Media Capital (part of the 
Spanish group Prisa), who faced a significant reduction of its revenues (from 244 million euros in 
2009 to 193 million euros in 2011), also reported positive profit figures, but was responsible for 
7.5% of the newly unemployed journalists in that period. Except for Media Capital, none of these 
groups faced a significant reduction in their revenues. 
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Table 1. Portuguese media groups’ revenues (results in millions of euros) 
Groups/ Year 2009 2010 2011 
 Revenues Net profit 
results 
Revenues Net profit 
results 
Revenues Net profit 
results 
Media Capital 244 19 224 14 193 2 
Impresa 248 8 268 10 247 -35 
Cofina 118 17 120 5 114 5 
RR 22 1,3 22 - 3.9 23 1 
Source: Own elaboration from Entidade Reguladora para a Comunicação Social annual reports [8] 
Controlinveste, one of the most significant Portuguese media groups (with two of the major daily 
newspapers, a major news radio station and a presence in pay-tv), was responsible for 26% of 
journalistic redundancies. Because it is not a publicly listed company consolidated figures for the 
group are not publicly available. However, the data that can be accessed points to losses ranging 
from 4 million euros in 2009 to 17 million euros in 2011, in the subsidiary firm that controls both 
newspapers (DN and JN) [9]. News of an unsustainable debt is widely alleged rather than confirmed 
[10] so it is not possible to gain in-depth knowledge of Controlinveste economic performance. The 
current configuration of the group, (which until 2005 was a relatively minor player in the media 
sector), resulted from the leveraged buyout of news outlets in the Lusomundo company 
(newspapers and a radio station), which in turn belonged to Portugal Telecom, a major Portuguese 
telecommunications company. Significant debt was incurred in the context of economic crisis and 
the decline in readership and advertising. Controlinveste thus faced deep financial problems, and 
part of its equity was sold, with 27.5% being acquired by the Angolan trust fund of António 
Mosquito [11]. 
Within the Controlinveste universe, another tendency worth mentioning is the internal 
reorganization of its specialized product offerings, such as photojournalism and financial/ economic 
information. Arguing for the need to improve cost and resource efficiency, the group established a 
centralized newsroom to produce economic information for all the different titles of the group and a 
photo agency to provide images for all the group titles. 
Controlinveste is not the only case where Angolan capital has taken a stake in Portuguese media 
groups. Other examples include the weekly newspaper Sol (a minority interest within the Cofina 
media group) and the establishment of a consortium for the acquisition of magazines from the 
Media Capital group, part of the financially troubled Prisa universe (Almiron and Segovia, 2012). A 
recent newspaper article focused on the presence of Angolan capital in Portuguese media groups, 
highlighting the fact that most of the shares were minority holdings [12]. Nevertheless, one Angolan 
group stands out in this respect; namely, Newshold, which owns the weekly newspaper “Sol”, 15% 
of Cofina and 1.7% of Impresa. Newshold has also expressed an interest in the possible buyout of 
the Portuguese public television service, an initiative that was under consideration by the 
Government [13]). Moreover, these changes in private media groups came at a time of government 
disinvestment in public services (television RTP and the Lusa news agency), which resulted in job, 
cuts as well as wage reductions. 
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During this period, the only entity that showed any concern over the possible loss of quality in 
journalism and press functions was the journalists’ union. Cost reductions and job losses have been 
accepted as normal in the economic crisis environment, and little concern has been apparent either 
in civil society or within the media regulator entity. When requested to deliberate on 
Controlinveste’s proposed redundancy of 122 journalists in 2009, the Portuguese regulator, 
Entidade Reguladora para a Comunicação Social (ERC), stated that it was not their task to evaluate 
media management strategies. However, the ERC’s viewpoint only considered media operations in 
terms of a market economy; losses in advertising were assumed to be unavoidable. Their 
consequences in regard to the likely decline in the quality and diversity of information, according to 
the ERC, would have to be evaluated by the readers. The ERC also stated that content sharing 
(photos and economic information) between different publications within the Controlinveste group 
was not a matter that the journalists could oppose, thus rendering this restructuring strategy 
legitimate [14]. 
Crisis and regulation 
When a new law was passed in 2005, the ERC had a new configuration—with the new 
board/council entering into operation in 2006. The rationale for the new architecture of media 
regulation was to give it more legal powers and to raise its legitimacy by stressing the ERC’s 
independence. The first mandate of the ERC (2006–2011) corresponded with a period in which 
Portugal faced one of the worst economic and financial crises in its history. This mandate was 
particularly important because of the implications for media ownership and concentration (over 
which the newly-configured ERC had jurisdiction).  
Law 53/2005 establishes that the ERC is obligated to ensure the non-concentration of ownership 
of entities pursuing media activities, with the aim of safeguarding pluralism and diversity. However, 
Portugal has no pluralism or concentration law with a specific mechanism for limiting 
concentration, and the wording of the 53/2005 law is merely qualitative (see Silva, 2007). This 
limits the scope of the ERCs remit, as it is very unspecific, but in principle, it could also be 
transformed into an advantage if the council board were to assume a more comprehensive 
interpretation of the law.  
In regard to concentration and ownership, the ERC did issue one major decision with the aim of 
favoring pluralism at a national level, at the expense of the economic interests of private actors. 
This happened with a newcomer group in the Portuguese scenario, Ongoing (which had holdings in 
business newspapers and pay-tv in Portugal and Brazil, and also a 25% share of Impresa). Ongoing 
wanted to buy Media Capital (to be sold by Prisa). The ERC found that the accumulation of 
holdings involved was potentially harmful to pluralism as both groups (Impresa and Media Capital) 
held strong positions in the television market. However, in 2009, the ERC decided not to approve 
the launch of a fifth free access channel. According to the regulator, none of the projects applying 
for the bid fully met the stated objectives, and thus the market was not opened to further 
competition. This decision was in line with the interests of established players in the television 
market, which contended that there was no advertising space for another free channel. 
Apart from overseeing concentration in the media sector, the ERC does not have much room to 
manoeuvre when it comes to ownership. The regulator’s jurisdiction applies only to media activity 
subject to licenses, such as terrestrial television or radio. Press initiatives are free, as is any launch 
of pay-tv, net-tv or any other form of journalistic content on the Internet. Those outlets are only 
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subject to registration with the regulatory entity. In that matter, the ERC [15] registered a reduction 
of publications in Portugal: in 2011, there were 3169, down 17% from 2008 (2656). In that same 
period, cancellation of publications outpaced new registries. This was particularly evident in local 
publications where cancellations (113 in 2011) were three times as frequent as new registries (30 in 
2011). National publication cancellations (230 in 2011) were double that of new registries (102 in 
2011). In contrast to the significant reduction of paper publications, there was a notable increase in 
the number of television services. Between 2008 and 2011, 25 new subscription television services 
were launched, as well as six new television services for international communities—which resulted 
mainly from the retransmission of content previously produced for national audiences. 
The ERCs primary responsibility in respect to ownership is to make rulings on changes in the 
control of media companies, by authorizing the sale and transfer of radio frequencies or by 
renewing terrestrial radio and television licenses. From 2008 to 2011, ERC conducted a radio 
license renovation, involving 331 processes. Of those, only 20 licenses were revoked, due mainly to 
bureaucratic technicalities, such as failure to meet deadlines or submit the required documentation 
to demonstrate that the local radio companies had no debts to the Portuguese State (via tax or social 
security). These economic aspects of radio activity were over-emphasized and the purposes of radio 
for local communities were not evaluated at all. There was no assessment of the importance of local 
radio in providing local information and promoting local identity.  
The ERC’s website displays the processes and decisions adopted by the board. In respect to 
pluralism, a file compiling the decisions on control and designation of media outlets shows that 
there were 105 processes between 2006 and 2011. Approximately 90% of those processes related to 
radio, a sector that appeared very dynamic in this period. Portugal is rather peculiar when 
considering radio licenses, as the number of national or regional frequencies is very low, and radio 
activity is based mostly on local frequencies. National radio brands exist, but they are broadcast 
using a retransmission chain through local frequencies that are “rented” or bought by national 
multimedia groups. 
This is why assessing changes in radio designation/programming is important, as it is not only a 
matter of naming radio stations. Different names usually meant that these stations assumed the 
name of another, centrally transmitted radio service. Thus, changes in radio names effectively 
meant the transfer of the radio frequency such that programming could be centrally broadcast by a 
major radio provider. Therefore, most of the ERC’s decisions dealt with authorizations for the 
retransmission of national radio content or programs on local channels. These were generally 
requested on the grounds of market difficulties and falling advertising revenue. The argument of 
local radio owners/managers to justify the retransmission was, mostly economic: the need to ‘lower 
the costs’, the change being ‘in the interest of local advertisers’, or due to the ‘shortcoming of 
advertising market’ or to the ‘current national and international crisis’. 
In the period analyzed (see Table 2), the ERC issued 42 authorizations to retransmit centrally 
broadcasted content on local frequencies. The weight of national media groups has increased over 
this period, displaying their increasing interest in the consolidation of their audience at a national 
level. Since national or regional frequencies are legally unavailable to new projects, the only 
possible way to broadcast radio nationally is to create a network retransmission chain using local 
radio licenses. Because the transmission agreements do not take into consideration formal 
ownership arrangements, the creation of national radio networks using local frequencies provides a 
mechanism through which the legal limits to concentration of media ownership can be 
circumvented. Between 2001 and 2010, each radio group had a limit of five frequencies, but some 
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major groups acquired a wide share of the territorial coverage. This was particularly apparent in the 
strategy adopted by Media Capital, from which two-thirds of the applications originated. Seven 
authorizations (16%) were also given to RR, which launched a new service, radio SIM (aimed at 
elderly audiences). Thus, RR acquired extended broadcasting coverage. 
Table 2. Processes involving changes in radio programming or ownership analyzed by the regulator 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Changes in ownership  0 5 14 4 5 14 
Changes in radio services 4 6 6 15 16 8 
Involvement of major 
multimedia groups [17] 
25% 45% 50% 80% 76% 81% 
It becomes clear that the ERC allowed the increased concentration in radio broadcasting to occur—
in some cases, with formal ownership transfer, but in others just by authorizing an agreement 
between central radio and local companies. All the authorizations were issued according to the 
existing law, and each one may be unquestionable in terms of its formal adherence to the 
legislation. However, it is clear that the regulator did not adopt a general overview of local radio in 
Portugal, and neither did they promote a framework to conceive radio in terms of the plurality and 
diversity of local services. Concentration of ownership has always been positively considered in 
terms of political discourse (Sousa and Silva, 2009; Silva, 2004) and the Portuguese tradition in that 
respect is not to interfere. This is a legacy that ERC seems to have found difficult to resist. Local 
diversity is thus reduced, and even if local radio stations do have a daily news service, this is not 
sufficient to guarantee locally oriented information. The editorial control of these services is, most 
often, centrally organized according to the media group’s news values and routines. The loss of 
local distinctiveness can be problematic when one considers that “locally produced content enables 
local citizens to access producers directly, so that content can better reflect local distinctiveness and 
cultural diversity, promote audience involvement in local discourse and thereby stimulate local 
participation and democracy […] Distinctiveness may be expensive compared to the relative 
cheapness of generic imaging and content, but the preservation of heritage—both cultural and 
radiophonic—may yet be worth considerable effort and expenditure as well as political will” 
(Starkey, 2012: 168/178). 
Again, there has not been any public concern expressed on this de facto media concentration, 
with the exception of the journalists’ union criticizing this trend and the ERC’s agreements [16]. In 
newspaper articles, reports on community protests over the end of their local radio can rarely be 
found. Indeed, there has been no national debate on radio (even less about local radio) suggesting 
that this has been a mostly silent process driven by an economic rationale, at the expense of local 
diversity and cultural pluralism.  
The movement towards increased concentration of local radio is likely to accelerate in the 
following years because there has been a legal change to the limits on ownership holdings in the 
radio sector. As noted earlier, up to the end of 2010, each group was limited to five radio 
broadcasters and a maximum of 25% of overall broadcaster holdings in the same municipality. In 
December 2010, a new law was passed which relaxed the restrictions on concentration of ownership 
to 10% of the total licenses awarded in the country. This means that a group can now own more 
than 30 local broadcasters and up to 50% of the licenses awarded at the municipal level. The radio 
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sector used to be the most restrictive in Portuguese media law, as far as constraints on concentration 
of ownership are concerned, but the clear trend, in the years since Portugal has been a democracy 
has been to expand those limits (Silva, 2005).  
The profile of the processes in 2011 (Table 2) highlights this reality: for the first time, the 
number of changes in operations of control, with regard to ownership transfer, has been greater than 
the changes in radio designation and programming (i.e. entailing particular arrangements between 
the owners of local radio and centrally broadcast radio). When the December 2010 law opened up 
the opportunity for transforming this informal control into an official ownership transaction, the 
media groups immediately took their chance. Of the 14 operations for control acquisition, six were 
not authorized by the ERC, but this occurred only because the law also established a two year 
period where no changes in the programming services could occur. Since this time restriction had 
not been observed (because changes in programming were made in the two previous years), ERC 
did not authorize these media groups to buy out the local radio stations. However, the media groups 
are clearly interested in pursuing this strategy and, after the period established by law, changes will 
most probably occur. 
Concluding remarks 
The Portuguese media universe is expanding, especially in regard to subscription and social media 
platforms. An internationalization of TV channels has also taken place during this period, with the 
ERC registering six new television services to international communities whereas only one existed 
prior to 2008. This raises questions about the real dimension of the crisis in the media universe. 
However, this does not mean that Portuguese media are not facing disturbing challenges. 
The ostensibly expanding Portuguese media universe has not led to more plural or diverse 
offerings in the range of media outlets. On the contrary, it is apparent that media groups are 
abandoning innovation and creative risk-taking in traditional media content. In fact, the main 
strategy in the period discussed here has been the replication of existing content forms. In radio, this 
been exemplified by central retransmission of services, while in pay-tv national services have been 
launched to international audiences. In the newspaper sector, as seen in the case of Controlinveste, 
the drive for cost reduction and economies of scale drove the centralization of both economic 
reporting and photo newsrooms. However, pluralism and diversity, the principles that ostensibly 
guide the rationale for media regulation, seem to be increasingly at risk.  
One trend, that becomes apparent as far as radio is concerned, is the gradual disappearance of 
local media, with the complicity of the regulatory body. The ERC permitted the emergence of a 
concentration of local radio channels, under the retransmission framework, and this, when 
combined with the net loss of local publications, represents bad news for the provision of local 
information. More generally, this critical trend is reinforced by the fact that, until now, local 
subscription television services are very limited and are constrained by audience size, while local 
web-TV services have not yet emerged in the Portuguese media ecology. Starkey’s observation that 
“one the great strengths of local media content is that it can—and often still does—express and 
support cultural, socio-political and economic distinctiveness” (2012: 168) raises concerns that the 
local character of the media ecology is being eroded in Portugal.  
In the recent crisis scenario, the ERC has been sensitive to the ‘media in crisis’ and the 
‘international and national crisis’ rhetoric deployed by media groups. However, they have been 
unsympathetic to the principles of pluralism and diversity and so have undermined their regulatory 
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mandate. The regulator’s institutional acquiescence to the media industry’s economic rationale is 
also apparent in their rhetoric concerning job cuts in Controlinveste, in its decision not to renew 
radio licenses, and also in its silence about media group redundancies (even when these media 
groups have not reported losses in their annual accounts).  
This crisis period and its aftermath has also been critical in regard to the increasing lack of 
transparency concerning ownership, patterns and financial processes. Considering the economic and 
financial context of the country, the need for capital in the Portuguese media has evidently been 
exacerbated—as is apparent in the cases of Impresa and Controlinveste. This, in turn, advances the 
influence of financialization on Portuguese media groups. A key problem here is that the shortage 
of credit and capital investment [17], due to banks’ lack of liquidity since the economic and 
financial crisis, makes domestic media groups vulnerable to overseas capital located in overseas 
trust funds. The ownership of the Angolan funds that have taken a stake in Portuguese media is not 
transparent because they are not subject to domestic disclosure rules, despite the fact that 
transparency in media ownership is ostensibly protected by law in Portugal. This may be the most 
worrying consequence of financialization, which has been worsened by the financial crisis. It is 
likely to have wider implications that will need to be addressed by media regulators and the 
researchers of media corporations. 
Author Bio 
Elsa Costa e Silva teaches at the University of Minho and is a researcher at the Communication and 
Society Research Centre. She has a particular interest in matters of concentration of ownership, 
regulation and new media. She holds a Ph.D. in Communication Sciences, having written a thesis 
on pluralism, diversity and the political blogosphere. She was a journalist for 10 years on a national 
daily newspaper. 
Endnotes 
[1] This research was funded by FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, in the 
frame of PEst-OE/COM/UI0736/2011, and developed in the frame of the research 
project “A Regulação dos Media em Portugal: O Caso da ERC” (PTDC/CCI-
COM/104634/2008). 
[2] Information on the economic performance of Portugal can be found in OCDE 
(2012), Étude Économique de l’ OCDE: Portugal 2012, Éditions OCDE.  
[3] More advertising losses than expected are, for instance, the reason why Impresa 
had to issue an explanation of the impairments declared for the first semester of 201: 
see http://bit.ly/1KlPRly. 
[4] Official figures for advertising investment in Portugal do not sustain these 
proclaimed losses in advertising revenues because they are calculated in terms of 
insertions within media formats at market prices. In this context, media companies are 
offering discounts on official market prices that are not disclosed openly and that do 
not allow us to confirm effective losses.  
[5] Data on reporters’ dismissals were made public by the journalists’ Union, which 
issued documents, such as Sindicato dos Jornalistas (2012) Desemprego dos 
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jornalistas – alguns dados, várias preocupações e 12 alertas. Available at: 
http://bit.ly/1DyNY2V. 
[6] As well as these five major Portuguese media groups, the regulator also covers 
Zon and Soanecom, but these two groups act mainly in television distribution, with 
less interest in content. 
[7] In Portugal, non-listed companies are obliged to deposit and register their annual 
accounts, but these are not freely available to the public. Some company figures can 
be found in the Amadeus business database. However, there is no associated 
management report to explain the figures, such as reasons for the losses registered in 
2010.  
[8] Annual reports can be found at http://www.erc.pt. 
[9] Amadeus database does not present consolidated figures for the Controlinveste 
group. In terms of the subsidiary firm for the newspaper business, Global Notícias, 
where dismissals were much more prominent, the database shows decreasing revenues 
for the period under analysis (87.5 million euros in 2009, 72.8 million in 2010 and 
72.4 million in 2011) and increasing losses (4 million in 2009, 11.2 in 2010 and 17.2 
in 2011).  
[10] Several news articles on this media group were published, such as in the 
newspaper Público: http://bit.ly/1tYmJhV. The group also produced its own press 
releases, such as http://bit.ly/18IHYeh. 
[11] Costa, António (2013) Bancos, Mosquito e Montez acordam com Oliveira venda 
da Controlinveste, Diário Económico, 26 November. Available at: 
http://bit.ly/1CTW2ga. 
[12] Lopes, Maria (2013) Angolanos nos grandes media portugueses embora com 
quotas minoritárias, Público, 6 June. Available at: http://bit.ly/1BYoZ97. 
[13] The privatization of the Portuguese public service broadcaster was included in the 
electoral programme of the political party PSD, who won the election in June 2011. 
The issue was debated in the public sphere until 2013 and then indefinitely postponed. 
The main reasons seem to be the lack of agreement within the governmental coalition 
(with PP, the other political party in power, not agreeing to the proposal) and the 
protest of the private channels who argued there was not enough advertising revenue 
for another commercial TV station.  
[14] ERC (2009) Deliberação 3/DJ/2009. Available at: http://bit.ly/1tYmJhV. 
[15] Data for ERC registries were presented at its annual conference. PowerPoint 
presentations are available at: http://www.erc.pt/pt/noticias/v-conferencia-anual-da-
erc. 
[16] Sindicato dos Jornalistas (2012) SJ contra ataques às rádios locais. Available at 
http://www.jornalistas.eu/?n=8941. 
[17] Primarily Media Capital and RR, which both have radio interests, but also two 
other radio groups, Música no Coração and NFM (which are not major groups but are 
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considered here because their holdings include stations across multiple regions and 
thus have a nation-wide presence). 
[18] The 70 billion euro bailout to Portugal was also used to re-capitalize banks, 
which received, out of that amount, 12 billion euros, thus showing the lack of capital 
within the Portuguese financial system.  
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